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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
judgment on the merits as the final determination of each party's
rights 88 is deemed paramount to reevaluating the fairness of a decision
in light of unanticipated posttrial developments. 8 4
While the circumstances in Miner arouse sympathy for the de-
fendants' plight, the decision seriously imperils the finality of judg-
ments in actions where damages are based on future contingencies. The
ramifications of general adoption by the courts of this practice are
staggering; they include a constant relitigation of previously tried
causes as the passage of time reveals the actual, as opposed to projected,
consequences of each dispute. 8 5
ARnIE 52 - ENFORCEMENT OF MONEY JUDGMENTS
CPLR 5222(b): Service of restraining order gives judgment creditor
rights superior to general creditors who subsequently take assignment
without consideration.
CPLR 5222(b) prohibits a judgment debtor served with a restrain-
ing notice from transferring any of his property until the judgment is
satisfied or vacated.8 6 Any person violating this section subjects himself
to a fine in contempt of court.8 7 Moreover, as a result of the decision of
N.YS.2d 291 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1964), aff'd without opinion, 24 App. Div. 2d 704,
261 N.Y.S.2d 1012 (2d Dep't 1965) (reversal of prior judgment).
Even in Miner, the one Appellate Division Justice who considered the appropriate-
ness of the vacatur, see note 166 supra, noted that:
Usually, a new trial because of facts discovered after trial relevant to the re-
covery of damages is directed only where fraud or deceit was practiced at the
trial ....
47 App. Div. 2d at 846, 868 N.Y.S.2d at 880 (Hopkins, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
Although he agreed that the verdict was excessive, Justice Hopkins concluded that the
trial court's order granting a new trial because of a posttrial development should have
been reversed. Id. at 847, 865 N.Y.S.2d at 881.
183 See generally 5 WK&M 1 5011.01, .03, .10-.13.
184 Nonetheless, "finality of judgments" is not an absolute rule to be followed
blindly by the courts. For example, in Bardach v. Mayfair-Flushing Corp., 49 Misc. 2d
380, 267 N.Y.S.2d 609 (Sup. Ct. Queens County), aff'd mem., 26 App. Div. 2d 620, 272
N.Y.S.2d 969 (2d Dep't 1966), the court, in its original judgment, had granted an ease-
ment. When the original purposes for the easement later became impossible to accom-
plish, and continued enforcement would only serve to impose a substantial hardship on
the owner of the premises, the court refused to enforce the judgment. While the court
relied in part on established property law doctrines, it also recognized its inherent dis-
cretionary power to properly vacate the judgment. 49 Misc. 2d at 383, 267 N.Y.S.2d at
612.
185 Carrying the Miner logic to its fullest extent would allow a plaintiff who out-
lived the life expectancy determined at trial to properly move to vacate the earlier
judgment and seek a new trial as to his actual damages. Theoretically, such a motion
could be made periodically until actual death.
186 CPLR 5222(b). The purpose of this section is to eliminate both the time and
expense of an enforcement proceeding. See 9 CARMODY-WArr 2d § 64:2, at 331 (1966).
187 CPLR 5251 states in pertinent part: "Refusal or willful neglect of any person
to obey a . .. restraining notice . . . shall . . . be punishable as a contempt of court."
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the Court of Appeals in In re International Ribbon Mills, Ltd.,88
when a judgment debtor, subsequent to service upon him of such re-
straining notice, makes an assignment without consideration for the
benefit of creditors, CPLR 5222(b) gives the judgment creditor a
superior interest in the debtor's assets as against the assignee. Chief
Judge Breitel, writing for the Court, reversed the holding of the Appel-
late Division, First Department, that mere service of the restraining
notice did not create a lien against a subsequent transferee. 89
The judgment creditor, Aijan Ribbons, Inc. (Arjan), had served a
restraining notice on the judgment debtor, International Ribbon Mills,
Ltd. (International), within eight days of obtaining the judgment.
Some 18 days thereafter, International executed a general assignment
for the benefit of creditors. In a special turnover proceeding, Arjan;
claiming a superior lien, sought satisfaction of its judgment from Inter-
national's accounts receivable then in the possession of the assignee,
Sturtz. The Supreme Court, New York County, ordered the turnover
in the amount of the judgment, but the Appellate Division, First De-
partment, reversed and dismissed the petition. 90
On appeal, Arjan contended that it had acquired a lien on the as-
signed property by virtue of the service of the restrainingnotice and by
the issuance, pursuant to CPLR 5230, of a property execution to the
sheriff. On the latter point, the Court -was unable to determine from
the record whether the execution had been returned unsatisfied,19 an
event which would have extinguished whatever lien had been created. 92
However, the Court held that service of a restraining notice inde-
188 26 N.Y.2d 121, 325 N.E2d 157, 565 N.Y.S.2d 808 (1975), rev'g 42 App. Div. 2d
354, 352 N.Y.S2d 1 (Ist Dep't 1973).
189 42 App. Div. 2d 354, 252 N.Y.S.2d 1, discussed in The Survey, 49 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
170, 188 (1974). Accord, City of New York v. Panzirer, 23 App. Div. 2d 158, 162, 259
N.Y.S.2d 284, 288 (Ist Dep't 1965); In re Joseph H. Fisher & Co., 43 Misc. 2d 821, 822,
252 N.YS.2d 290, 391 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1964); Rinzler v. New York City Transit
Auth., 37 Misc. 2d 77, 78, 234 N.Y.S.2d 904, 906 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1962); 6 WK&M
5222.21.
190 See 42 App. Div. 2d at 355, 358, 352 N.Y.S.2d at 1, 5. The First Department. was
influenced by the deletion of a sentence from the original draft of CPLR 5222(b) which
had provided:
While a restraining notice is in effect, no transfer, whether by the garnishee or
by the judgment debtor, of property or of a debt subject to the notice' shall be
effective against the judgment creditor who served the notice, except as other-
wise provided by law or order of the court.
Tim REP. 252. One authority has stated that this omission was not merely an oversight
on the part of the legislature, but a deliberate decision that service of a restraining
notice should not effect a lien. See 6 WK&M 522220.
19136 N.Y.2d at 124, 325 N.E.2d at 138, 365 N.Y.S.2d at 810. Such a situation- was
possible bhecause there is no requirement that the clerk of the issuing court record the
return of an unsatisfied execution. See 5 WK&M 5021.11.
192 See generally 6 WK&M 5202.12.
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pendently entitled the judgment creditor to a priority, obviating the
need to remit the case to Special Term for resolution of the contradic-
tory assertions regarding whether the judgment had been returned
unsatisfied.193
Much of the confusion over whether CPLR 5222(b) creates a lien
in property subsequently transferred in violation of that section was
caused by the deletion of a sentence from an original draft which ex-
pressly provided that a restraining notice renders subsequent transfers
ineffective. 194 Noting this omission, the International Ribbon Court
concluded that "in this respect, CPLR does not afford judgment credi-
tors the same priorities enjoyed under prior law ..... ,195 Nonetheless,
the absence of specific statutory authority did not, in the Court's
opinion, preclude a finding that a lien was created, since, as the Court
explained further, a judgment creditor's rights as against a bare assignee
are not exclusively derived from the CPLR.196
It is elementary ancient law that an assignee never stands in any
better position than his assignor. He is subject to all the equities
and burdens which attach to the property assigned because he re-
ceives no more and can do no more than his assignor .... The
principle applies with equal or greater force to an assignee for the
benefit of creditors who asserts rights to property against a judg-
ment creditor which, prior to the assignment, had served a restrain-
ing notice on its assignor .... 197
Moreover, as Chief Judge Breitel pointed out, to subject a debtor to
contempt for transferring property in violation of a restraining notice
while giving his assignee without consideration priority in such prop-
erty over a judgment creditor would be against sound public policy.198
Stressing the equities, the Court pointed out that Arjan had acted
promptly and diligently in collecting its judgment. On the other hand,
since the belated assignment had been without consideration, it was the
Court's view that there could be no appealing equities in favor of the
assignee.199 Consequently, the rights of the judgment creditor were held
193 36 N.Y.2d at 124, 325 N.E.2d at 138, 365 N.Y.S.2d at 810.
194 See note 190 supra. CPA 779-a, a provision similar to CPLR 5222(b), created a lien
in the debtor's funds in the hands of a third party. Davis & Warshow, Inc. v. S. Iser,
Inc., 30 Misc. 2d 528, 534, 220 N.Y.S.2d 818, 826 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1961). Corres-
pondingly, it was a violation of the restraining notice for the judgment debtor to make
a subsequent assignment for the benefit of creditors. See Rossman Corp. v. Polizzi, 231
App. Div. 872, 246 N.Y.S.2d 849 (2d Dep't 1930) (mem.).
195 36 N.Y.2d at 125, 325 NY.E2d at 138, 365 N.Y.S.2d at 810 (citations omitted).
196Id., 325 N.E2d at 139, 365 N.Y.S.2d at 811, citing In re Nassau Expressway, 56
Misc. 2d 602, 605, 289 N.Y.S.2d 680, 684 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1968).
197 36 N.Y.2d at 126, 325 N.E.2d at 139, 865 N.Y.S.2d at 811 (citations omitted).
198 Id. at 125, 825 N.E2d at 189, 365 N.Y.S.2d at 811.
199 Id. at 126, 825 N.E2d at 139, 865 N.Y.S.2d at 811.
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superior to those of the assignee. The Court did not address the ques-
tion of whether such rights would be superior to those of a purchaser
for fair consideration. In all likelihood, the equitable approach would
conversely require that the rights of the judgment creditor be subordi-
nated to those of such a purchaser.200 Although its decision might be
criticized for misreading, if not ignoring, legislative intent, there can be
little doubt that the Court achieved results which were not only fair,
but also commendable since the vitality of an otherwise "impotent
remedy" 201 was restored.
INsuRANcE LAW
Ins. Law §§ 670-77: 90-day notice held "as soon as practicable" under
no-fault.
When the New York Legislature instituted no-fault insurance by
enacting the Comprehensive Automobile Insurance Reparations Act,202
commentators criticized the concept on both constitutional and equi-
table grounds.2 13 Recently these views found support in a Supreme
Court, Kings County, decision declaring the no-fault act unconstitu-
tional.204 Few critics, however, have anticipated the manifold procedural
problems arising in the day-to-day operation of the Act.20 5
200An analogy may be made to CPLR 5202(a) which provides that a judgment
creditor who has delivered an execution to the sheriff has rights superior to those of a
transferee who received the property for less than fair consideration. A purchaser for
fair consideration, however, is expressly not affected by these rights. CPLR 5202(a)(1).
See 6 WKL-M 5202.19, 5202.21.
201 In re Nassau Expressway, 56 Misc. 2d 602, 605, 289 N.Y.S.2d 680, 684 (Sup. Ct.
Queens County 1968). Under prior decisions, CPLR 5222(b) was held to no longer afford
judgment creditors priorities formerly enjoyed under the CPA. See, e.g., City of New
York v. Panzirer, 23 App. Div. 2d 158, 163, 259 N.Y.S.2d 284, 288 (1st Dep't 1965).
Of course, a contempt action against the wrongful judgment debtor has always been
available. CPLR 5251. Concededly, were the judgment creditor to show in the contempt
proceeding that the misconduct of the judgment debtor was responsible for an actual
loss, the court could impose a fine sufficient to reimburse him. In re Nassau Expressway,
56 Misc. 2d 602, 604, 289 N.Y.S.2d 680, 683 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1968). The likeli-
hood of collecting this sum from a person who had previously divested himself of all
assets, however, would be remote. See id. at 605, 289 N.Y.S.2d at 684. On the other hand,
if the judgment creditor were to fail to sustain this burden of proving actual loss, the
imposed fine could not exceed the costs incurred by him in bringing the motion for
contempt. McDonnell v. Frawley, 23 App. Div. 2d 729, 257 N.Y.S.2d 689 (1st Dep't
1965).
202 N.Y. INs. LAw §§ 670-77 (McKinney Supp. 1974).
203 See, e.g., Note, No-Fault Insurance in New York: Another Hazard for the Inno-
cent Driver, 40 B'KLsYN L. Rav. 689 (1974). The New York no-fault plan is described as
a "palpably unfair, inadequate, and inherently unconstitutional compromise which will
not only fail to correct the defects of the present system, but is likely to compound them."
Id. See also Comment, New York Adopts No Fault: A Summary and Analysis, 37 ALBANY
L. R v. 662, 710-15 (1973).
204 Montgomery v. Daniels, 81 Misc. 2d 373, 367 N.Y.S.2d 419 (Sup. Ct. Kings County
1975).
205 See Schwartz, No-Fault Insurance: Litigation of Threshold Questions Under the
1975]
